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STUDIES OF PERCEPTION OF INFORMATION ON THE SPATIAL POSITION
OF AN AIRCRAFT
M. Zebrowski
In studies on a method of presenting pilots with basic /35*
flight information, much space has been devoted to processes of
perception. For they play a fundamental role in setting criteria
for minimum visibility, with the aim of identifying the surface
of the earth at the moment of transition from flight-instrument
observation to maintaining orientation by this means.
The subject of the studies was three groups of problems of
a perceptive nature:
• the accuracy of defining the slope of the flight path
during lack of visibility of the actual line of the horizon
• the accuracy of predicting the time remaining before land-
ing under conditions of limited external visibility
. the structure of the shape of the earth Is surface necess-
ary for the maximum accurate determination of flight-path slope
and prediction of time remaining to landing.
Methods of Study
Studies of the perception of information on spatial position
by pilots at the moment of transition from flight-instrument ob-
servations to observations of the earth's surface originated from
a test of their presentation in artificial form - in the form of
television. The medium is called the Contact Analog Display. It
is a method of electronically creating flight information used by
the pilot during flight with visibility of the actual surface- of
the earth. It is based on six fundamental problems of spatial
orientation:
1) the internal reference grid relative to the shape of the
window glass in the cabin ensures the pilot of feeling good in-
side the cabin
2) external reference grid: the line depicting the position
of the actual horizon
3) line perspective: the network of lines running to the line
of the horizon permits one to fix position, height, and course
changes
4) structure of the terrain surface: horizontal lines indic-
ate changes and convergent lines height and distance
5) the size and shape of objects flying in the field of
vision indicate distance and relative mutual position of the ob-
jects in front of one
6) parallax of motion: movement along the surface of the
earth depicts the rate of motion and distance from the surface.
* Numbers in the margin indicate pagination in the foreign text.
Results of the Studies
The study results have permitted the formulation of three
basic findings.
1. During flight in near-surface darkness or under conditions in
which the contour of the horizon line cannot be seen distinctly,
the pilot locates himself as being lower than he really is. This
gives rise to a tendency to bring the forward end of the aircraft
down too low.
This phenomenon is observed for the first time as an artific-
ially-created fact on the simulator. Initial technical difficult-
ies with lighting and the character of the television screen caus-
ed the lack of image depth. Where one ought to have found a dis-
tinct horizon line on the screen, there occurred a blurry, gray
area.
Pilots estimating the position of the horizon line invariably
put it lower than its correct position. According to their estim-
ates, it is lower by about 1/3 of the distance between the vanish-
ing image of the earth's surface and the actual position of the
horizon line. The response to this was to lower the "forward end"
of the simulator downward. Later experiments in the air confirm-
ed this fact. Fig. 1 illustrates the state of the illusion (line
B represents the actual position of the horizon). With level vis-
ibility of 800 m, the angle of vision between the plane of the
actual horizon and a straight line connecting the eye of the pilot
located at a height of 60 m with that detail of the earth's surf-
ace which was last distinguished amounts to about 4.9° (Fig. 2).
On the basis of the studies, one may predict that the pilot, un-
aided by other information, will place the horizon about 2.9°
lower than the actual position.
From the moment of glimpsing the actual horizon, the pilot
changes as fast as possible the inclination of the aircraft, with
the aim of correcting the flight path. Overload caused by bend-
ing of the flight path causes additional loss of hegiht. The
amount of height loss will depend on the class of aircraft (Fig.
3). For example, heavy aircraft (DC-8), in changing the slope of /36
a 5-5.5° flight path, loses about 18 m in height. This fact corn-
forces an increase in minimum height to begin circling once more
(decision height), to at least 25 m.
2. Approaching the earth"3 surface without information other than
its apparent movement in the direction of the observer, there is
normally an underestimation of the time remaining to landing.
It is established that pilots (but not just pilots) predict
the time left before landing surprisingly well, even in the case
of lack of knowledge of the rate of their movement, the size of
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observed objects, or the distance from the surface of the earth.
For the studies, six seconds was assumed remaining to landing.
The existence of a general tendency to underestimate the time re-
maining was established. It is known that if the aircraft has
5 seconds to land, pilots estimate this at 4 seconds, on the aver-
age, and level the flight off a little too early (Fig. 4). The
dotted line on this diagram illustrates the ideal time estimate.
The area under the curve represents cases of underestimation of
time left to landing; this is called the "safe" area. On the bas-
is of a statistical analysis of the results obtained based on a
normal-distribution curve, it may be predicted that when 4 seconds
remain to landing, pilots estimate this time as 3.2 seconds, on
the average, leveling off the aircraft 0.8 seconds too early.
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Such an estimate is too low in approximately 68% of the cases,
least once in 100 pilots the time was underestimated with an
error of 4 seconds, and so the leveling off was too early.
At
The upper side of the diagram plays the most important role -
overestimation of the time remaining to landing, the side called
"nonsafe". In an average of 28.5% of the cases, the pilot over-
estimates the time and in effect levels off too late. In every-
day aircraft use, this is manifested as a "hard" landing. At
times, this could turn out even worse.
Taking the vertical rate of aircraft descent to be 5 m/sec,
the decision height of 25 ra remains about 5 seconds time to land-
ing. Meanwhile, studies have shown that the minimum time during
which the earth must be seen before landing in order for the num-
ber of unsuccessful landings not to exceed 28% is aout 7 seconds.
From this, at a descent rate of 5 m/sec, the earth must be seen
from a height of about 60 m (7 sec X 5 m/sec + 25 m).
This part of the studies was based in large part on laboratory
studies, simulations, and statistical calculations. The smaller
results not hereby established should be considered in establish- /37
ing the meteorological minima for a class I landing. .
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3. Maximum safety of actual aircraft landing requires a suitable
design for approach lights and other visual aids defining the
earth's surface. Their density or separation in meters should be
equal to the distance covered in one second by the aircraft com-
ing up to land.
The most important source of perceiving the depth of an image
and of estimating distance and spatial orientation is construct-
tion of an image of the earth's surface or else its structural
gradient. If individual elements of the same size and shape create
the surface, the distant elements seem to more densely set than
those in the foreground. This causes the occurrence of image per-
spective. Studies have shown that the accuracy of estimating
surface slopes depends on the density of the structural size of the
optical image. When the number of structural elements is less than
that useful for establishing the gradient (theoretically three ele-
ments are sufficient), estimation accuracy falls to zero. Estimate
'accuracy increases with an increase in the number of structural
elements, but only until the point at which their size or posi-
tion reaches the eye's discrimination threshold. After crossing
it, estimate accuracy again falls to zero. It is shown that
moderate accuracy is estimating slope of the flight path, determ-
inations of the landing point, and location of the target point
may be used if the structural plan of the earth's surface is allow-
ed to distinguish the distance equal to the least distance which
the aircraft travels in 20 seconds. The greatest accuracy of pre-
dicting the landing point occurs when the ratio of the rate of
aircraft motion to the height of its flight is equal to unity,
V/h =1.0 (Fig. 5).
Because of the height of the landing aircraft steadily de-
creases , the ratio V/h tends toward infinity. From an analysis
of this relationship, it is understood that the separation of the
structural elements should be equal to the distance covered by
the aircraft in the time of a second. On this basis, the separa-
tion is assigned between individual lamp sets of approach lights
for landing, the runway path, or various visual designations for
it.
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Results
Errors of pilot perception and delay in reacting make meteor-
ological minima for a class I landing the limit for the safe, act-
ual landing of a transport plane, accomplished by a pilot on the
basis pf external observations. Landing with lower meteorological
minima requires the use of automatic landing systems without re-
gard to the role which the man will then fill.
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In Fig. 6 is presented the deviation of the aircraft flight
•path from the descent path, caused by an illusion in horizon-per-
ception by the pilot. Such a situation occurs approximately
when a pilot has completed the entire landing approach. As long
as he flies exclusively with the aid of flight-instrument indic-
ations, the aircraft will be flown along ILS descent planes. At
the moment the earth's visibility is used, the pilot passes into
a new descent pattern for his observation and maintenance of
spatial position. Illusion in perception of the horizon causes a
decrease in the descent path. An increase in flight-path slope
implies an increase in the vertical rate of descent and in flight
speed. A decrease in the power of the propulsion unit is respons
ible for this, as a rule. But above the approach lights, where
the apparent horizon occupies more or less the same position as
the actual, the pilot begins by dipping the aircraft to correct
the flight path. This often means the necessity for a power in-
crease. Sudden changes in power and slope in the final phase of
Fig. 6
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landing approach are useless and actually may be dangerous. These
facts require allowing for the introduction of an exact division
of staff functions during landing under severe weather conditions
and its visualization in the operating instructions of a given
flight crew. Generally it depends on the fact that the pilot ap-
proaching using flight instruments monitors their indications be-
fore the run at the edge of the runway path, without attaining
greater slopes, ^t this time, a second pilot is waiting for the
appearance of the earth and the approach lights. At the moment
their image is established, the pilot takes over the steering and
and executes the landing. If at a critical height, nothing is
-seen, he executes another circle without interfering with the
steering. Different flight crews apply different variants in
function division according to many factors. Operating instruct-
ions on a "Flight" PLL for such a division of staff functions
under difficult weather conditions are not included.
